Nan Zhen Huang v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-30-2016 
Nan Zhen Huang v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Nan Zhen Huang v. Attorney General United States" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 331. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/331 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 





UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






NAN ZHEN HUANG, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
      Respondent 
______________ 
 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF 
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
 (Agency No. A076-089-293) 
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Before: VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. 
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Yerman & Associates  
225 Broadway, Suite 1700 
New York, New York 10007 
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 Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Jonathan A. Robbins, Esq. [ARGUED] 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
Ben Franklin Station 
P.O. Box 878  
Washington, D.C. 20044 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  
Nan Zhen Huang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a decision 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion to reopen her removal 
proceedings.  Because the BIA acted within its discretion, we will deny the petition. 
I 
 Huang entered the United States in 1998 without a valid entry document and, as a 
result, was charged as removable.  In proceedings before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), 
she conceded removability but applied for asylum and withholding of removal, asserting 
a fear of persecution based on China’s family planning policies.  The IJ found her not 
credible and denied her applications.  The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in August 2002.  
She then filed a motion to reopen on the same grounds, which the BIA denied in October 
2002.  
 Huang remained in the United States despite having been ordered removed.  
According to her affidavit, she began attending church in 2014, was baptized soon after, 
and is now a devout Christian.  Based on this changed personal circumstance and the 
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alleged increasingly poor treatment of Christians in China, she filed a second motion to 
reopen.1  In that motion, she for the first time she added a claim under the Convention 
Against Torture.  In support of her motion, she presented the U.S. State Department’s 
2011 and 2012 International Religious Freedom Reports, excerpts from the 2012 and 
2013 Annual Reports of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, the State 
Department’s 2012 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in China, and the 2013 
Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(collectively “U.S. government reports”).  In addition, she submitted the 2011, 2012, and 
2013 ChinaAid Association (“ChinaAid”) Annual Reports on Chinese Government 
Persecution of Christians and Churches in Mainland China, various media reports, a letter 
from her brother, a baptism certificate, a letter regarding her church attendance, a 
personal statement, and an asylum application.   
 The BIA recognized that Huang offered evidence of “some incrementally stricter 
enforcement of restrictions against some religious practices and churches over the last 16 
years,” AR 5, but concluded that the U.S. government reports did not “demonstrate a 
material change since the time of the respondent’s hearing in 1999.”  AR 4.  The BIA 
also noted that Huang’s evidence of harassment and detention of some Christian “house” 
church members is indicative of a “longstanding problem” which has not materially 
                                                 
1 In an affidavit accompanying her motion to reopen and in her appellate brief, 
Huang reiterated her fears about China’s family planning policies, but she did not include 
a related claim in her motion to reopen and, in any event, represented at argument that 
she has abandoned the claim.  Oral Arg. Tr. at 1:20:30, Jan. 26, 2016.   
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changed since 1999.  AR 5.  Finally, the BIA found that Huang did not make a prima 
facie showing that she was entitled to relief.  For these reasons, the BIA denied the 
motion to reopen.  Huang petitions for review of the Board’s decision. 
II 
The BIA had jurisdiction to review Huang’s motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We review the denial of a motion 
to reopen for abuse of discretion, “regardless of the underlying basis of the alien’s request 
for relief.”  Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011).  We give “broad 
deference” to the BIA’s ultimate decision, Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), which we will disturb only if it is 
“arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,” Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Where, as here, the BIA concludes that the 
petitioner has not established a prima facie case to reopen proceedings, we review the 
BIA’s findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard.  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 
F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under this standard, we must uphold the BIA’s factual 
findings “unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  





 Huang does not dispute that her motion to reopen is both time- and number-barred.  
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that a petitioner generally may file only one 
motion to reopen and must do so “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final 
administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened”).  To 
overcome these limitations, Huang bears the burden of “present[ing] material evidence of 
changed country conditions that could not have been presented during the hearing before 
the IJ.”  Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007); 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 
 The BIA has “a duty to explicitly consider any country conditions evidence 
submitted by an applicant that materially bears on his claim.”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 
F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  It is not, 
however, required to “parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of 
evidence offered by the petitioner,” and may consider the evidence “in summary fashion 
without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion.”  Id. (internal 
quotations marks and citations omitted).  That said, a failure to consider all the evidence 
the applicant offers constitutes an abuse of discretion.  Id.    
The BIA considered the evidence Huang presented and did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the motion.  The BIA afforded the U.S. government reports great weight in its 
analysis, which accords with our view that such reports are a trustworthy source for 
assessing country conditions.  See, e.g., Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 89 (3d 
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Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have held that State Department reports may constitute ‘substantial 
evidence’ for the purposes of reviewing immigration decisions.”); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 
333 F.3d 463, 477 (3d Cir. 2003) (observing that U.S. government “[c]ountry reports . . . 
are the most appropriate and perhaps the best resource for information on political 
situations in foreign nations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 Moreover, contrary to Huang’s arguments, the BIA also considered other evidence 
that she offered, noting that she presented research articles and media reports in addition 
to the U.S. government reports, and acknowledging that her evidence showed “some 
incrementally stricter enforcement of restrictions against some religious practices and 
churches over the last 16 years.”  AR 5.  While the BIA opinion does not recite the names 
of the research articles to which it refers, the record discloses that the only 
nongovernmental research articles Huang presented come from ChinaAid, which Huang 
argues demonstrate a worsening of conditions since at least 2007.  Huang also presented 
media reports that described poor treatment of Christians.  Thus, the BIA’s identification 
of these categories of documents that Huang presented and its statement that they 
purported to show “incrementally stricter enforcement,” AR 5, demonstrates that it 
considered these materials.  
 The fact that the BIA gave more weight to the U.S. government reports than these 
other materials is both approved by our case law and warranted here.  Insofar as the 
reports from the U.S. government and ChinaAid present different pictures of the country 
conditions for Christians in China, the BIA was well within its discretion to defer to the 
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U.S. government reports rather than the reports of an advocacy group that provides 
accounts and statistics without a reference to their source.2  Similarly, while the media 
reports convey a message about worsening conditions, none describe events in the 
province in China to which Huang has ties.  This is significant because, as the BIA noted, 
“the evidence indicates that the likelihood of persecution . . . varies from region to 
region.”  AR 5. 
  Though Huang offers evidence of troubling conditions, the BIA had before it 
evidence from U.S. government reports that describe the situation as continuously poor.  
Thus, we cannot say that the BIA erred in concluding, based on this evidence, that Huang 
failed to present proof that the country conditions concerning the treatment of Christians 
                                                 
2 The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in giving limited weight to the letter 
from Huang’s brother, in which he claimed “attending underground church or spreading 
the gospels is illegal in China,” AR 407, because it was “an unsworn statement from an 
interested witness who is not subject to cross-examination, and it appears to have been 
created for the purpose of litigation.” AR 6; accord Chen v. Att’y Gen., 676 F.3d 112, 
117 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding that the IJ properly discounted a family member’s letter 
regarding country conditions because the letter had not been authenticated).     
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in China have materially changed since her removal hearing in 1999.3  The BIA did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.4   
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Huang’s petition for review. 
                                                 
3 We note that this Court has denied petitions for review of BIA decisions denying 
motions to reopen based on an alleged increase in the persecution of Christians in China, 
albeit in not precedential opinions, concluding that the BIA’s decisions, based upon its 
review of the same or similar materials to those presented in this case, did not constitute 
an abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 569 F. App’x 136, 137-38 (3d Cir. 
2014) (per curiam) (reviewing period from 2007 to 2013); Zhang v. Att’y Gen., 543 F. 
App’x 277, 285-87 (3d Cir. 2013) (reviewing period from 2004 to 2013); Lin v. Att’y 
Gen., 525 F. App’x 123, 124-25 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (reviewing period from 2007 
to 2012); Ouyang v. Att’y Gen., 493 F. App’x 330, 332-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) 
(reviewing period from 2006 to 2011); Chen v. Att’y Gen., 479 F. App’x 440 (3d Cir. 
2012) (per curiam) (reviewing period from 2002 to 2010); Zhang v. Att’y Gen., 488 F. 
App’x 640, 642-43 (per curiam) (3d Cir. 2012) (reviewing period from 2001 to 2011). 
4 We conclude that the BIA also did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
Huang failed to carry her burden of making a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. 
